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Emily Potter and Candice Oster 
COMMUNICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: 
PUBLIC RESPONSIVENESS AND MA ERS 
OF CONe RN 
Abstract 
Since climate change captured global attention ill the J990s, the primte illdh'idual, 
addressed as (j member of a concerned puh!ic, has occllpied a focal position 
in the discourse of' environmental amelioration. Recelltlv, (/ ral1ge of prominent 
books, films and television programs-- for example, Tim Flannery~' The Weather 
Makers (2005), At Gore:~ An Inconvenient Tmth (2006) and ABC Tn Carbon 
Cops (2007) - ha1'e promoted the role of'the indi1'iduol as the 'starting point' 
f(;r eUixtive ellvironmental action. 771ese texts assume that the provision and 
comprehension of sufficielll information to the public about climate change will 
change individual habits and practices, This accords tl'ith the 'infimnarion-deficit 
model' in environmental communication research, a concepl that asserts a direct 
conncction hetween indil'idl/al mvarencss and response, and coffective action. This 
paper discusses the limitations olthis model, pervasive in both popular and official 
approaches to climate change. It will interrogate the philosophical assumptions that 
lInderlie it, in which natllre and clIlture are polarised and the human is positioned 
ill a certain, and separate, relationship to the non-h1lman world -- all inheritance 
ol the vcly logic that enables the continued exploitation ()l natllre, Appzving Bruno 
La/our :,' notion of a 'mafter of concern' to climate change, tvhere the gathering 
ol ({ range of' irreducible ,{()I'ces and im/materialities continually produce these 
phenomena, this paperp/'Oposes that. in thinking about climate change as essel7tial~v 
unrepresentable, a dUl'erent mode (?/pliblic engagement with the issue is asserted. 
In the same month that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released 
its Fourth Assessment Report, presenting a bleak vision of the climate future of 
the Earth, the then Australian federal Minister for the Environment, Malcolm 
Turnbull, announced an initiative to phase out energy-inefficient incandescent 
light bulbs by 2009-10. According to the minister, who contextualised his 
decision in light of the IPCC report that had been released a few weeks earlier, 
'scientists are telling the world that we need to reduce our greenhouse emissions 
as soon as possible. Phasing out incandescent light bulbs is a fairly simple thing 
everyone can do to help reduce our emissions.' (Turnbull, 2007) The statistics 
that accompanied this announcement estimated that replacing incandescent bulbs 
with compact fiuorcscents in homes would reduce emissions in Australia by up 
to 800 000 tonnes per year. 
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While applauded by some as a real initiative from a government which had 
spent years trying to keep climate change off the political agenda in Australia, 
the decision to phase out incandescent bulbs was criticised by others as a knee-
jerk and narrow reaction to a growing desire amongst the electorate for action on 
climate change. According to Greg Bourne, chief executive of the World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF), the shift to compact fluorescent lights is an attempt to pass on the 
costs of improving national energy efficiency 'directly to consumers' (Frew and 
Bresser, 2007). We begin with this account because it indicates the tenns on which, 
in light of the significant and ,vide-ranging data contained in the IPCC's Fourth 
Assessment Report, the former Coalition federal government preferred to keep the 
discourse 011 appropriate responses 10 climate change - that is, within the realm 
of the private individual and the sphere of domestic consumption. Its reluctance 
to legislate for climate change mitigation, preferring market-driven activity to take 
the lead instead, found a compromise in the focus upon individual practices of 
consumption as a driver of social, cultural and economic transformations. 
This paper is concerned with the central position of individuals and their domestic 
practices in discourses of climate change, and argues that the Turnbull light globe 
initiative was not just indicative of the fixmer federal governmenfs position, but 
more broadly reflects the cultural framing of climate change mitigation strategies 
in the public sphere. Connecting the realms of private and public is an assumed 
How-through of appropriate information that will translate a melange of policy 
decisions, scientific warlling::" amI puJilical appeals into aILered dorneslic practice. 
This assumption is made transparent by the influence of the 'infonnation-deficit 
model' in environmental communication theory, which asserts a strong, often 
simplistic link between individual awareness and collective action on climate 
change. What this model neglects are the contexts, or relational milieux, within 
which inflwmation is produced. transmitted and received. It is the insufficiency of 
the information-deficit model and the privatisation of responses to climate change 
that this paper will go on to address. Through a discussion of climate change as 
a 'matter of concern' that disconcerts a private/public boundary, we will propose 
a different way of thinking about climate change communication, where the 
essentially unrepresentable nature of the phenomenon becomes the impulse for a 
new kind of engagement between humans and environments. 
'Over to you' 
It is unsurprising that the activities of individuals provide the focus for much 
popular and academic discussion of climate change mitigation (Dunlap, 1998; 
Hinchliffe, 1996). Macro-practices and policies for addressing climate change 
ultimately need the support of citizens after all, while the impact of domestic 
practices on greenhouse gas emissions is not insignificant. It is estimated that 
households account for around 20 per cent of Australia's greenhouse emissions 
annually (Australian Greenhouse Office, 2007). The idea that individuals need 
to feel empowered to "make a difference' in the faee of the intensifying threats 
of climate change, and the snail-pace of government resolution and action, also 
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informs this approach. Tim Flannery's best-selling book of non-fiction, The 
Weather Makers (2005), for instance, makes this appeal to its readers: 'You can. 
in a few months rather than the fifty years allowed by governments, easily attain 
the 70 per ccnt reduction in emissions required to stabilise the Earth's climate. All 
it takes are a few changes to your personal life, none of which requires serious 
sacrifices.' I lis belict~ outlined in the book's concluding chapter, 'Over to You', 
is that 'in tackling climate change the consumer is in a most fortunate position' 
(Flannery, 2005: 303, 302). 
In the last tyVO years, a variety of prominent books, films and television 
programs have echoed this point, most notably Al Gore's film An Incol1l'ellient 
Truth (2006). Like The Weather jVlakers, Gore tells a multi-dimensional story of 
political culpability and the need for massive economic and social restructure to 
counter climate change, but both texts end with a call to the individual to make 
certain changes within their own lives. They each outline a series of domestic 
consumption-based strategies that the readers and viewers can act upon in an 
immediate way. Network Ten's Cool Aid (2007), a program that claimed to 
undertake a 'national carbon test'. took this a step further, conducting audits 
on the carbon emissions of five 'ordinary Australians' bcfc)l'c presenting a range 
of 'simple methods all Australians can implement to reduce greenhouse gases' 
(ENEWS, 2007). A similar program, Carholl Cops on the ABC (2007), challenged 
a series of households to 'save money and combat global warming' by modifying 
their homes and domestic practices (ABC onEne). InfOfmlng lhese illlervt::utiull-
style 'reality' shows, as well as the more political, historical ancl narrative-driven 
texts of Gore and Flannery, is the notion that information provision is key to 
changing individual practices, which in turn will propel market transfOlmations 
and government policy. 
The information-deficit model in climate change research 
Research into public understandings of, and responses to, climate change began 
in the late 1980s, with the information-deficit model soon emerging as a common 
explanatory frame. According to this model, the modification of individual 
behaviours is central to an agenda of climate change mitigation, and what drives 
and enables behaviour change is the provision of "appropriate information' (Blake, 
1999: 2(0). Researchers who first examined the issue of public comprehension 
expressed concern over a range of misconceptions held by the lay public regarding 
the mechanisms underpinning climate change and its main causes. In particular, 
researchers noted that the public tended to conflate climate change with the 'hole in 
the ozone layer', confused weather with climate, and lacked a clear understanding 
of how and why climate change occurs. In the early 1990s, when climate change 
was still a relatively new concept in public discourse, these miscomprehensions 
were pronounced. In one of the first studies of lay perspectives of climate change, 
using ethnographic interviews with 14 participants, Kempton (1991) found that 
the participants had little k.nowledge and understanding of the nature, causes and 
potential effects of climate change. Six years later, Gowda et al. (1997) found 
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that secondary school students frequently confused ozone depletion with climate 
change, and showed a general lack of understanding of the causes and effects of 
climate change. 
More recent studies of public responses to climate change have continued 
to foreground a lack of comprehension among individuals as a key concern for 
mitigation strategists (Bord. 2000; Stamm, 2000). For example, a 2003 review 
of public opinion polls in 24 countries (Brechin, 2003) showed that the lack 
of knowledge and understanding reported in earlier research continued to he 
evidenced cross-nationally. While a review of public opinion polls from a range 
of countries showed that 'the rnajority of publics across many nations speak 
of personal concern about global warming as well as on the seriousness of the 
problem' (Brechin, 2003: 125). the widespread misunderstanding of the issue is 
still reported. More people than ever are cognisant of climate change, but domestic 
behaviours remain ambivalent and in many respects unchanged. This was noted 
by Plotnikoff et al. (2004) in their survey of 600 households in Alberta, Canada. 
The authors found that, although Albertans appear to be engaged in a range of 
environmental behaviours at home - such as turning off lights. recycling and 
setting back the thermostat at night - they frequently ignore energy efficiency 
when purchasing consumer goods, and rarely make environmentally conscious 
transport decisions. 
Given the consistency of the findings of the research into public knovv'ledge 
and understanding of climate change, it has been widely proposed that members 
of the lay public need to be better informed about climate change in order for 
them to engage in pro-environmental practices. According to Brechin. 'better-
informed citizens everywhere are more likely to shape their own behaviours Land] 
contribute more positively ltoJ protecting thcir environments' (2003: 118). As noted 
at the beginning of this article, this belief characterises the approach taken by the 
Australian government (although it is not alone in this) to the issue of climate 
change mitigation. The National Greenhouse Strategy of the Commonwealth of 
Australia -- which has not been revised since its launch in 1998 - states that: 
Information and education programs ... complement scientific research and 
can foster broad community understanding of climate change issues. This 
understanding is a prerequisite for informed community and individual 
action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to climate change, as 
well as building community support for actions initiated by governments. 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 1998: 21) 
The infDrmation-defici1 model suggests thai people are rational. responsible 
actors who simply require the appropriate information in order to alter their 
behaviours and support policy change. It also assumes a linear passage from source 
to audience to action. As Macnaghten and Jacobs (1997) point out, the rationale of 
the model is that the provision of inJDrmation is sufficient to 'engender a sense of 
social responsibility' that will motivate behaviour change (1997: 7). In studies that 
identify a range of factors contributing to what Stoll-Kleeman et a1. (2001) term 
'the psychology of denial' - fDr instance, the fear that lifestyle changes will incur 
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substantial material costs, blaming the inaction of others, and speculating on the 
value of individual elforts in the face of climate change's enormity - information 
provision is championed as the means to counteract such beliefs, and promote 
a drive to social responsibility (Stoll-Kleeman at aI., 2001; Pruneau, 2001). But 
can information alone really accomplish this goal? Does the dissemination of 
information operate in the way the inJonnation deficit model suggests? And can a 
sense of social responsibility be fostered by the discursive terms of the individual 
consumer. formed in isolation from the public realm? We will go on to consider 
these questions in light of the apparent limits of the information-deficit model, 
and the reconceptualising of participatory strategies for climate change mitigation 
that a different mode of public communication enables. 
Structures, institutions and relational contexts 
Despite its popularity as an explanatory frame. the information-deficit model fails 
to take into account a number of factors which suggest a need to rethink the 
work of public communication for the mitigation of climate change. These range 
from what I Jarrison et al. (1996) call the 'practical and discursivc constraints of 
context [thatJ inhibit people's freedom of choice and action' (1996: 215). to the 
narrated life of climate change, and the complex, ever-forming relations between 
humans and the non-human material world. A variety of studies have pointed to 
the multiple stmctural and institutional constraints on the response of individuals 
to climate change imperatives. Rather than the perceived 'barrier' to action that 
the lack of appropriate information is considered to be, these constraints are 
elastic, and emerge from the relationship between the individual and the milieu 
of institutions and communities in which the individual exists. Macnaghten 
and Jacobs' (1997) study of public reluctance to adopt sustainable development 
practices points to a lack of tmst in government organisations as a key point of 
issue. Using focus groups to explore the salience of the discourse of sustainable 
development, the authors found a deep suspicion of government and business 
sustainability initiatives, with palticipants articulating an extremely weak sense 
of personal agency in relation to environmental concerns. They report that 'in 
these circumstances inf{)rmatiol1 ... is not the problem': 
however knowledgeable people become and however concerned about the 
issues they are, it is the institutional or relational context which will primarily 
determine their behavioural response (Macnaghten and Jacobs, 1997: 21). 
Bulkeley (2000), a scholar highly critical of the information-deficit model, 
endorses this point of view, arguing that there is a need 'to move away from 
a narrow conception of public knowledge towards recognition of the complex, 
fluid, and contradictory nature of public understanding of global environmental 
issues' (2000: 329). She points to the danger generated by a focus on individual 
practices of 'shift[ingJ the burden of responsibility' in climate change mitigation 
from macro-economic and policy forces (and major emitters) such as government 
and industry, 'to concerned individuals' (2000: 328). 
Media International Australia 
Storytelling and the nature of truth 
Relational contexts, of course, extend to the non-human world, and a factor 
inJ<H"ll1ing public response to climate change is individuals' experience of their local 
environment. Research indicates that individuals can find it difficult to reconcile 
the severity of climate change statistics with what they historically know about 
their immediate surroundings, and what they experience on a day-to-day level 
(Potter, 2005). The increasing severity of the drought in much of Australia, with 
plummeting levels of rainfall, has paralleled a rise in public discourse of climate 
change concerns. At the same time, others argue that /·;flared experience, as much 
as individual perception - both shaped and generated by commonly accessed 
media-- has a significant impact on our responses to climate change. 
'The information-deficit model treats information as neutral and objective: the 
transmission of infonnation follows a linear process from souree to subject. Yet 
climate change, in a velY powerful sense, has a continually constituted existence 
in narrative, developed through means such as media reportage, but also in the 
many other discursive fields that Ji'ame the topic: science, policy, political economy, 
health, domesticity, philosophy and even theology. In this sense, climate change is 
the story, rather than something materially coherent that narrative merely reports 
upon. Trumbo and Shanahan's (2000) survey of communication research on climate 
change highlights the role of narrative structure in popular media accounts of the 
phenomenon. As they argue. 'issues' or 'facts' do not in thernselves communicate. 
They are made meaningful to individuals by their incorporation into st01Y, a process 
that inevitably involves dramatic concerns - 'decisions about story line, actors, 
and themes, which take into account the shared social realities of storyteller and 
audience' (2000: 201) - and. in the act of telling. create a space of commonality 
in which all are implicated. Rather than focusing upon the individual as the 
site of climate change mitigation, this approach foregrounds cultural change in 
its broadest sense. It contests the assumption underlying the information-deficit 
model that facts can be conveyed in a straightforward fashion, and suggests that 
our cultural stories give shape to the real. 
The mass media are frequently put forward as a mechanism responsible for 
increasing public awareness of climate change, particularly as the media have 
often been identified as contributing to common misunderstandings of climate 
change. Fortner et a1. (2000), for example, found that members of the American 
public are generally trusting of the mass media, making it a valuable source 
of public information. Yet a diJIerent study of the impact on American public 
opinion of the high-profile 1997 debate over climate change found no evidence 
that 'media coverage of an issue would lead to greater learning among highly 
educated respondents' (Krosnick et a1.. 2000: 254). The uncertainties of climate 
change, and the largely invisible nature of greenhouse gas emissions, mean that 
as a phenomenon it docs not easily fit a descriptive or dramatic paradigm that 
would otherwise mark out headline issues - what Ungar (2000) calls 'hot crises'. 
Ungar contrasts the public attention captured by the hole in the ozone layer in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s with the relatively muted response to climate change 
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globally over the last two decades. While the hole in the ozone layer could be 
isolated, delimited and graphically represented as threatening an 'immediate and 
concrete risk' (2000: 297), climate change is diffuse, future-oriented and lacks a 
focal point of recognition. To this extent, Ungar suggests, it is the work of the 
media, more than the subjective experience of living in the world, which generates 
the sense of impending climate crisis. 
What is at issue here is the essentially unrepresentable nature of climate change. 
The information-deficit model leaves no room for the impossibility of capturing 
the totality of a thing. It infers that facts translate to reality. While the confused 
nature of environmental 'truth' or scientific 'fact' is often cited as evidence of 
information-deficit concerning climate change, it is also referenced by critics of 
this model who question the composition and mutability of knowledge itself. How 
can we begin to know climate change in ways that will enable its truth to be told? 
Brossard et a1. (2004) write that the media will always frame an environmental 
story in a pmticular way, picking and choosing from certain facts and perspectives. 
Despitc this, because of the mcdia's claim to objectivity - that is, prescnting 
both sidcs of the story spacc is frequently given in equal amounts to majority 
and dissonant opinions, allowing 'cven on questions ... which arc by conscnsus 
seen as having been resolved from the standpoint of science, voices of discord 
... to penetrate the discourse' (2004: 365). 
Herrick's (2004) study of the use of scientific information in public policy 
highlights what he ca.lls 011;;; 'fulility' uf expe<:lillg sdence tu be ubjedive. Drawing 
upon the philosophy and history of the discipline, he points out the 'interpretative 
and socially constructed character of scientific findings' (2004: 419), which as a 
result are value-laden and discursively shaped. Yet Herrick explains that, among 
the public as much as the policy writers, there remains an unreasonable expectation 
of 'objectivity or "soundness" of seientifk inputs' to the policy process (2004: 
419), reflccting a belief that truth is something inherent rather than something 
constructed. 
This is not to say that there is no such thing as a reality of climate change. In 
defence of the real, Latour (2004) describes the appropriation of critical scepticism 
for political purpose as a significant concern for public responsiveness to climate 
change. He traces the deployment of scepticism by Republican lobbyists in the 
United States with a purpose to 'artificially maintain ... scientific controversy' over 
the issue, even while 'most scientists believe that fgloball wanning is caused largely 
by manmade pollutants that require strict regulation' (2004: 2). As Republican 
lobbyists have discovered, the interests of industry are more keenly protected by 
questioning this consensus as publicly as possible. In response, Latour insists upon 
the need for the reclamation of tmth, not as a political or philosophic assertion 
but as a 'matter of concern'. 
Matters of concern 
Latour's concept of the matter of concern is posed as alternative to the partial ity 
of l~lctS. His is an innovative view of the multiplicity of elements that constitute 
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the real: facts matter, but they can never tell the whole story. They assemble with 
other "ingredients' to produce a matter of concern. We come to know a thing-- an 
entity or 1hrce, for instance, such as climate change --- through a recognition of the 
multiple ways in which it comes into being. As he explains, these constituents are 
not predetermined; thus the thing remains open to what it will become and how 
it will be known. Unlike a matter of fact, matters of concern cannot be explained 
through a single point of view or discursive frame. Climate change, in this sense, 
is a gathering of these different entities, issues and forces. While climate change 
manifests through the oxidisation of carbon and environmental transformations, 
its reality is equally produced in policy, economy, newspapers and the individual 
who installs solar panels on her roof. This is to say that climate change cannot be 
understood by natural or cultural frames alone: it is a nature-cultural phenomenon 
or, as Latour articulates, a "gathering' of participants---- human and non-human 
--- which makes and maintains its existence. 'Give me one matter of concern,' 
he argues, 'and I will shovv you the whole earth and heavens that have to be 
gathered to hold it firmly in place.' (2004: 246) 
In this light, the task of communicating climate change becomes an ambiguous 
one: what exactly gets communicated? How can climate change, as a matter of 
concern, ever be fully represented to the public? Scientific facts or instructions for 
improved domestic practice will only communicate so much. This, in itself, is not 
a problem if it is simultaneously admitted that this is so, if they are not claimed 
as the reality of climate change and the basis for public response. But commonly 
climate change is depicted in public discourse as a discrete event, identified through 
a mappable number of sources and concerns. Even in recent months, when en-atic 
rainl~111 in Australia has frequently brought climate change on to the same page 
as the drought, climate change is rarely represented as a complex and unfolding 
gathering of forces and impacts: social health, employment, the economy, leisure, 
water management and deforestation, to name a few (Futerra, 2005). Tim Flannery 
made this point in a recently published newspaper article in which he reported on 
two social and environmental events connected to rising global temperatures (the 
decrease in circumcisions in Kenya and the death of orang-utans through wildfire 
in Kalimantan): 'such catastrophes are reported occasionally in the media but the 
link with climate change is almost never made' (2007: 16). 
The isolation of climate change from other human and non-human, material 
and immaterial processes mirrors the information-deficit model's conception of 
the individual which is constituted prior to its entrance into the social, and the 
disassociation of the domestic sphere (as a discrete locus of inputs and outputs) 
from the realms of industry and policy. It also reflects a bifurcated vision of the 
non-human world as something that exists to knowledge and perception outside 
of us, rather than as something with which we are caught up, and from within 
which we know and speak. It is this logic of human and non-human separation 
(instead of co-constitution) that sustains continued environmental exploitation. 
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In conclusion: Hamlet's Mill and the possibilities of the public 
Despite attempts to map and know it. climate change remains an unfixed 
phenomenon. As a concern hoth material and discursive, climate change is infonned 
by how all humans respond to its multiple nature. The information-deficit model 
simplifies this relationship, and in doing so denies the unfixed constitution of 
climate change. This is not to argue that the provision of information to the lay 
public is irrelevant ~ indeed, it is vital for a politically and environmentally 
literate public. IIowever, the assumptions underlying the information-deficit model 
--- of human rationality, the impartiality of filct, the discrete life of environmental 
events and the transparency of representation ~ obscure rather than illuminate 
the qualities of a gathering phenomenon that is at once natural and cultural. 
Individuals inhahit cultural stories, hut they are actors (and authors) within 
these, not merely receptors of information. Moreover, 'inf<.mnation' is not an a 
discrete channel of fact; instead, it is caught up in a web of policies, actions, 
beliefs, carbon dioxide, rising tide levels and drying wetlands, to name a few. 
Is the imperative, then, not to communicate climate change ~ with the aim of 
public responsiveness as if it werc quantifiable in all its aspects, but rather to 
engage the public with its essentially unrepresentable reality, to implicate all of 
us within the im/material networks from which it constantly emerges? Climate 
change confounds representation hecause we do not stand outside of it. 
llamlet ,S i\fill is a public a11work design cognisant of these ideas. Designed by 
the Australian artist Paul Carter, and planned for installation by the banks of the 
River Thames in London in 2010, Hamlet:), Mill is intended as a publicly situated 
response to climate change that simultaneously, and in a contingent, incremental 
fashion, produces its public of response. It will do this by engaging passers-by 
in a continually materialising story of human and non-human entanglements that 
are both naITated and enacted. lIamlet ,s· Mill understands climate change in terms 
of the sublime: 'something so large that it overwhelms imagination's capacity 
to comprehend it' (emier, 2007). Its ambition is to convey this sublimity, to 
work with analogues of enviromnental processes, and to acknowledge that while 
representation does not have the power to capture the real, it can illuminate its 
composition. 
The impossibility of representing climate change underscores this puhlic 
art project. The design of Hamlet:S' Mill will take the form of a giant pivot or 
gatepost sited in the river that rotates in response to the rate of global climate 
change. Its intended situation references the fact that recent and proposed inner 
urban/environmental developments in London are sited in the inundation zone 
of the River Thames: if sea-levels rise as predicated under climate change, these 
developments will be seriously threatened. LED screens ribboned through the 
pivot form are planned, and these will display constantly updated data on carbon 
emissions and sea-level rise, gamered from various monitoring sites across the globe. 
Communication in this context is not a straightforward process of transmitting and 
processing information: the data display will notate environmental change rather 
than "translating' cnvironmcntal conditions into eeliain rneaning. Hamlet :s' A1il1 
will bring its public into proximity with the movements of global matter ~ tidal 
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changes, Gulf Stream currents and temperature changes - as the pivot rotates, 
turned by the rhythm of the waters of the Thames. This is communication of a 
different sort, where new meanings emerge as we re-enter the story of which we 
are already a part. 
Instead of information-provision configured as a conduit between the private 
and the public, here acts of discourse - as bodies, stories, matter and digital data 
interact actually produce the public realrn: a space in which new strategies for 
action emerge and political and environmental futures are negotiated. Hamlet :S' Mill 
indicates how a new conceptual ground might help us to rethink the generation 
of public responsiveness to climate change, and the role of communication within 
this. There needs to be a broader understanding of what inspires responsiveness in 
individuals, and in turn the contexts which inform, and are infoDl1ed by, individual 
response. Thinking about climate change as a matter of concern, within which 
expertise and efficacy are constantly renegotiated, and where the individual never 
stands outside its gathering reality, challenges the privileging of the private consumer 
as the key to social transformation. An always-forming public, jm/materially 
constituted, is a much more promising source of inspiration and action. 
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